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Abstract: 
 In June, 2013, a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court brought to an abrupt and likely 
permanent end the most important provision of the most successful civil rights law in U.S. 
history.  Initially passed in 1965, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required “covered 
jurisdictions,” at first in the Deep South and later extended to Texas, Arizona, Alaska, and 
certain counties and townships in other states, to “pre-clear” any changes in their election laws 
with the Justice Department or the District Court of the District of Columbia before putting them 
into effect.  Laws that changed the political structure – for instance, redistricting laws, 
annexations, and shifts from district to “at-large” elections for local governments – were 
restricted, as well as provisions and practices that directly affected individuals’ rights to vote.   
While acknowledging the success of the law in greatly increasing the number of African-
American and Latino elected officials, Chief Justice John Roberts contended in his majority 
opinion in Shelby County v. Holder that the problems of 2013 were much less grave than the 
“pervasive . . . flagrant . . . widespread . . . rampant” voting discrimination of 1965 and that the 
coverage formula was outmoded because “today’s statistics tell an entirely different story.” 
 Neither the Chief Justice nor any scholars or civil rights proponents or opponents have 
systematically examined the evidence on the entire pattern of proven voting rights violations 
over time and space.  Was the Chief Justice correct in asserting that such violations no longer 
tracked the coverage scheme in Section 4 of the Act -- that, as he put it, the relationship of the 
formula to problems of vote dilution was purely “fortuitous”?  Had the number of violations 
diminished so much in the years leading up to the 2006 renewal of Section 5 that Congress 
should have ended preclearance altogether because discrimination had basically disappeared?  If 
the number of voting rights lawsuits has diminished, why is that so? 
 Based on the largest database of voting rights “events” – successful lawsuits, Section 5 
Justice Department objections and “more information requests,” and consent decrees or 
settlements out of court that led to pro-minority changes – ever compiled, this paper provides a 
unique overview of the history of U.S. voting rights from 1957, when the first U.S. civil rights 
law in 82 years passed, through 2013.  It shows that the Chief Justice’s factual assertions were 
incorrect, that the coverage formula was still congruent with proven violations, and that to the 
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extent that recorded violations had decreased, that was not because problems had ended, but 
because the Supreme Court had made it more difficult to win lawsuits. 
 
I. Introduction 
 In the Supreme Court’s first consideration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 
Chief Justice Earl Warren began by remarking that “The Constitutional propriety of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.”2  
Although Chief Justice John Roberts quoted the passage from Katzenbach in his 2013 opinion 
overturning the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Act, he took a very different stance toward 
history than his predecessor did.  Devoting only two short sentences to the painstaking 84-page 
opinion of federal district court judge John Bates
3
 and only seven more to the thorough 32-page 
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by Judge David S. Tatel,
4
 
Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the 15,000-page record compiled by Congress, which the lower 
courts discussed extensively, as irrelevant because “Congress did not use the record it compiled 
to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions.”5  “History,” Roberts reminded us, 
“did not end in 1965.  By the time the Act was reauthorized in 2006, there had been 40 more 
years of it.”6  Yet apart from comparing voter registration rates in 1965 and 2004 in six Deep 
South states
7
  and making a brief, misleading reference to the rate of Department of Justice 
objections to election law changes,
8
 the Chief Justice ignored that history.  
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What if we delve into the history that Chief Justice Roberts disregarded?  What if we 
look at where proven violations of the VRA and related laws and constitutional provisions 
actually took place and at the course of those violations over time?  How do the geographical and 
temporal patterns from the years shortly before the passage of the Act in 1965 through the years 
after its latest renewal in 2006 reflect on the adequacy of the Section 4 coverage formula that the 
Chief Justice summarily rejected as “based on decades-old data and eradicated practices”?9  
What can we learn about how voting rights law has actually worked by arraying the patterns of 
legal actions involving minority voting rights in maps and charts?  Although Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion rested entirely on his assertions that voting rights violations had severely 
declined and that they were no longer concentrated in jurisdictions covered under Section 4 of 
the VRA, he only briefly and superficially examined the “historical experience” that he and 
Chief Justice Warren before him considered key to “the Constitutional propriety of the Voting 
Rights Act.”  When we examine that experience in detail, will we reach the same conclusions 
that Chief Justice Roberts announced in Shelby County? 
 To answer questions about the adequacy of the Section 4 coverage scheme, as well as 
about the nature of and reasons for the patterns of legal events involving voting rights, I have 
compiled the largest database on such events in existence.  Drawn largely from lists of cases and 
other actions compiled by civil rights organizations, individual attorneys, and the Department of 
Justice, the database has been supplemented by ferreting out details and following case citations 
from published cases, from PACER, and from newspaper articles.  The events include any 
successful or unsuccessful case, published or not, decided or settled; Section 5 objections and 
“more information requests” by the Department of Justice; and election law changes that 
manifestly took place as a result of the threat or reality of legal challenges.  The sources are 
described in Appendix A to this paper, and the methods of expanding the information from cases 
and objections that appeared in the lists are described in Appendix B. Collection and 
manipulation of the data began in 2009, and it continues.  The data, which starts with the first 
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successful modern voting rights law, the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and proceeds with some 
confidence into 2006 and then no doubt less comprehensively into 2014, is incomplete and 
contains (unintentional) errors and omissions.  Nonetheless, it is far larger than any of the single 
sources that were presented to Congress during the process of renewing the VRA in 2006 and 
that were scrutinized in the district and appeals court opinions in Shelby County.   For example, 
Prof. Ellen Katz’s database of Section 2 cases, discussed extensively during the 2006 
congressional hearings and included in my database with Katz’s kind permission, contains 324 
cases.  The total number of cases and other events in which the minority side was successful 
contained in my database is currently 4173. 
 
II. Mapping the Voting Rights Act 
 The most dramatic way to assess the adequacy of the coverage scheme is to consider a 
series of maps.  Map 1 looks at every county in the 48 contiguous states.
10
  Each county in which 
no event took place during the entire 57-year period is colored blue, while the projections 
extending above every county that experienced a “successful” legal event – i.e., an event in 
which the minority side won – is proportional to the number of events in the county over the 
whole period.  Red counties experienced the largest number of events, orange counties the 
second largest, and so on, down to blue-gray, for counties with one or two events.  The total 
number of county-level events was 3839.  The 334 events that took place on the state level, such 
as challenges to state redistrictings, are not included in the county-level maps, but they are taken 
into account in the graphs. 
 The conclusion from Map 1 is simple to state.  The number of high-rises over the South, 
the focus of the Section 4 coverage scheme, dominates the real estate.  Outside the South, only 
New York City, where there were 137 precinct boundary changes in 2001 that were objected to 
by the Justice Department, and California, where I have included numerous events connected to 
the 2001 California Voting Rights Act, contain many tall buildings.   
Map 2 outlines the Section 4 coverage scheme that the majority of the Supreme Court 
overturned in Shelby County, an outline that will be familiar to most readers of this article.  
Comparing it to the Map 1 tracing of the counties where an election rule or law was overturned,  
the coverage scheme looks to have been quite precise.  That is, it accurately predicted the 
locations of the proven voting rights violations over the period, the vast majority of them since 
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1965, to which Chief Justice Roberts referred.  Of the 3839 county-level events, 3519 or 91.7% 
took place in covered jurisdictions.
11
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Map 1:  Voting Rights Events by County, 1957-2014 
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Figure 2:  Counties Covered Under Section 4 at the Time of  
Shelby County v. Holder 
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But not all counties are of the same size.  The 19 events that took place in Dallas County, 
Texas, with a voting-age population in 2010 of 1,713,876, should perhaps not count as much as 
the 10 events in Dawson County, Texas, which had a voting-age population in 2010 of 10,411.  
Map 3 divides the number of events in each county for the whole period by the total population 
and rescales the color markers to reflect the change.  It reflects the same general pattern, but puts 
much more emphasis on the rural South, which was the principal focus of attention of the 1965 
Act.   
 Map 4 changes the observer’s point of view, looking at 57 years of voting rights history 
as someone from the North might have seen it.  From the North, restrictions on minority voting 
rights look like almost entirely a southern and southwestern problem.  In 2009, in Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, Chief Justice Roberts pointedly questioned 
whether the problems that Section 5 had been meant to address in 1965 were still “concentrated 
in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”12  In Shelby County, he quoted that passage 
from Northwest Austin and criticized Congress because it had failed to “narrow[] the scope of the 
coverage formula” since 1965, and because it had neglected to determine “how that 
discrimination [in covered jurisdictions] compares to discrimination in States unburdened by 
coverage.”  The 1965 coverage formula was outmoded, he said, because “today’s statistics tell an 
entirely different story.”  If not in 2006, then certainly after Northwest Austin, the Chief Justice 
remarked disapprovingly, Congress should have produced an “updated statute.”  “If Congress 
had started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage 
formula,” the Chief Justice announced, and he contended that the relationship of the coverage 
formula to problems of vote dilution was purely “fortuitous.” 13 
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Figure 3:  The Number of Voting Rights Events, 1957-2014,  
Divided by the County Populations 
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Map 4:  Northern View of Voting Rights Events, 1957-2014 
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 What might the pattern of voting rights cases and other violations look like over time and 
space if we try to visualize the description implicitly pictured in the Chief Justice’s majority 
opinion in Shelby County?  Because discrimination in the Deep South in 1965 was, as he 
describes it, “pervasive . . .flagrant . . .widespread . . . rampant,” we should presumably 
hypothesize that the number of events was large, and that it shrank markedly over time as, in the 
Chief Justice’s words, “due to the Voting Rights Act, our Nation has made great strides.”14  Even 
though there might have been an actual increase in events as the Act gave the government and 
civil rights attorneys more legal tools, and there might have been periodic increases in legal cases 
and objections challenging the decadal redistrictings, the trend would have traced a linear 
decline, and the realization that discrimination was no longer so concentrated in the South would 
have led to an increasing proportion of cases being filed and won outside the South.  This 
hypothetical picture might look like Figure 1, where the area outlined in red represents covered 
jurisdictions and that in blue, those not covered in Section 4.
15
 
 How does the hypothetical graph compare to that based on reality?  Figure 2 substitutes 
non-fiction for fiction, and it paints a very different picture from that underlying the majority 
opinion in Shelby County.
16
  Before 1965, when we know that discrimination was most rampant, 
there were very few cases.  As Department of Justice and non-governmental civil rights lawyers 
got more experience with the VRA, as legal cases were decided favorably, and as Section 5 was 
extended and Section 2 was amended, the number of events mushroomed.  When, later, the 
Supreme Court sharply and suddenly reined in the Act, particularly in a series of cases in the 
1990s, the number of events shrank just as markedly as it had grown in the 1970s and 80s.
17
  But 
until 2009, when a large number of jurisdictions began to change from at-large elections to 
single-member districts under the threat of lawsuits under the California Voting Rights Act, 
included here for completeness, the graph is almost entirely red.  Before 2009, 93.8% of all cases 
and other events (including statewide cases) took place in covered jurisdictions, and there was 
only a small increase in the number of cases outside covered areas. 
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Figure 1:  A Hypothetical Timeline of Voting Rights Events as Chief 
Justice Roberts Might Have Seen Them in Shelby County, 1957-2014 
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Figure 2:  Actual Timeline of Voting Rights Events, 1957-2014, by 
Covered and Non-Covered Jurisdictions 
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 Another way to visualize the data is to compare maps of the events by county in different 
time periods.  Maps 5 and 6 summarize voting rights legal actions that took place in the years 
before Congress clarified Section 2 and effectively encouraged its use in 1982 with actions over 
a similar number of years from 1982 on, ending in 2005, which was the last year in which 
members of Congress considering renewal would have been able to look at before voting.  
Perhaps the chief justice was wrong about the shift of voting rights violations from south to 
north, but right about the downtrend in the sheer number of events.  Maps 5 and 6 provide strong 
evidence against both of the contentions.  Although there is a bit of suburban sprawl into South 
Florida and Southern California, the skyscrapers of Map 6 were markedly higher and denser in 
Map 6 than in Map 5, and they were still highly concentrated in the neighborhoods redlined by 
Section 4.
18
  
 Congress in 2006 was not presented with maps or other documents that laid out the 
pattern of proven voting rights infractions so starkly, but it received plentiful evidence in the 
form of lists and discussions of cases that showed that the problems were still overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the South and that discrimination continued to be widespread.
19
  A northern 
senator or member of the House, or a southern member who was sympathetic to minority voting 
rights, who read the 15,000 pages of evidence, would no doubt form in her mind images looking 
something like Maps 4-6 or Figure 2.  The few cases in non-covered jurisdictions that were noted 
during the debates
20
 must have seemed like trivial exceptions to the overwhelmingly dominant 
pattern, because in fact, they were.  And the map would have shown that the number of voting 
rights infractions had increased, not decreased, compared to the earlier period.  It is easy to 
understand why someone who formed an image like Maps 4-6 – based on the evidence, not on 
outmoded stereotypes or prejudices against the South – would see little reason to modify the 
coverage formula and every reason to continue the Act in full vigor. 
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Map 5:  Early Voting Rights Activity: 
Voting Rights Events, 1957-81 
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Map 6:  Voting Rights Activity Still Concentrated 
 in the South and Southwest, 1982-2005  
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The framers of the 1965 Act had only a general idea of where the most serious
21
 
restrictions would take place in the future, and they used a blunt tool, a combination of a history 
of “tests and devices” for voting and a pattern of low overall turnout, to target those areas.  That 
formula was substantially amended in 1975 to include states and counties that had printed ballots 
only in English, if at least five percent of the people of the area were “language minorities,” 
which added Texas, Arizona, Alaska, and scattered counties elsewhere to the coverage scheme.
22
  
In his opinion in Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts barely mentioned this amendment, which 
did not include political participation at all in the formula, a surprising omission in light of the 
fact that over a thousand events, nearly a quarter of the total, originated in Texas alone.  When he 
explicitly discussed the coverage formula, the Chief Justice refered only to the original 1965 
formula, not the 1975 expansion.  So Section 4 contained two formulas, one of which was based 
on turnout and the other, on a very small percentage of the population that formed a “language 
minority” – without any test of their ability to speak or read English.  But on the evidence of 
Maps 1 and 3-6 and Figure 2, it appears that the blunt tools of Section 4 succeeded in accurately 
homing in on the counties where the vast majority of violations would take place during the 
Chief Justice’s forty (and more) years since 1965. 
 
III. Counterfactuals Show How the Supreme Court 
Has Shaped Voting Rights Reality 
There were three basic innovations in Section 5: First, election laws or practices in suspect 
areas would be frozen at a certain time.  Second, any change would have to be approved by an 
authority outside of the South, either the District Court of the District of Columbia or the 
Department of Justice.  Third, the jurisdiction would bear the burden of proving that it had not 
acted in a discriminatory manner.  These prophylactic devices derived from the experience of 
attorneys, especially from the Department of Justice and especially during their attempts to 
litigate cases under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960.
23
  Although the congressional 
hearings on the 1965 bill spotlighted that experience, Congress did not design the coverage 
scheme by focusing it only on the states and counties in which there had been legally proven 
charges of voting rights violations.  If it had done so, there would have been many fewer states 
and counties covered, as Map 7, which details the geographic pattern of successful voting rights 
cases from 1957 to 1965, shows.  There were only 73 successful cases in those eight years, or 
about an average of ten a year, despite considerable efforts by a talented corps of Justice 
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Department attorneys.  All except one, a 1965 challenge to a literacy test in Monroe County, 
New York,
24
 were in a pocket of rural counties in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana.   
Map 7:  The Very Small Core of the Coverage Scheme:  
 Voting Rights Events From 1957 Through 1965 
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 Why were there so few successful cases when the Civil Rights Movement was so active 
in trying to register voters in the South and when the Department of Justice was for the first time 
since the First Reconstruction actively attempting to foster black voting rights in the South?
25
  
The obvious answer is that the legal tools and resources that were available were few and 
unwieldy, federal courts were often hostile, and there simply had not been enough judicial 
opinions, especially at the Circuit and Supreme Court levels, to settle many questions and 
smooth the path to victories by the civil rights forces.  As has often been noted, the insufficiency 
of the tools was precisely why the VRA was needed.  But that insight, emphasized by the 
contrast between the generally-recognized level of discrimination in 1965 and the small number 
and geographical compactness of the violations exposed by Map 7, has not been systematically 
applied to the history of the VRA after its passage, perhaps because no one before now has 
charted the whole sweep of successful challenges to anti-minority discrimination in its whole 
history. 
 Applied and expanded, the insight counsels that the number and character of voting rights 
violations recorded is a function not only of the extent or depth of discrimination, but crucially, it 
is also a function of the tools made available or restrained, particularly by judicial decisions.  
Thus, by rendering decisions that make it easier or harder to bring and win voting rights cases or 
make objections, the Supreme Court can, in effect, manipulate the evidence of discrimination, 
which it can then use, in a second stage, to justify a decision to further weaken or strengthen the 
tools.  It can create the reality that it subsequently reacts to.  The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 
have done exactly that. 
 The database contains a great many illustrations of this self-fulfilling prophecy or self-
generating-evidence hypothesis.  Figure 3 shows not only the effect of legal changes and court 
decisions on the success of cases brought under Section 2 of the VRA, but it also demonstrates, 
once again, the concentration of discrimination in jurisdictions subject to preclearance under 
Section 4 before Shelby County ripped the covers off.  Section 2 applies nationally, so that if 
discrimination were equal everywhere, one would expect to see an equal amount of blue and red 
in the graph.  Only in the foothills of the very most recent period, not in the mountains of the 
glory years of the VRA during the Reagan and Bush I Adminstrations, does the amount of blue 
equal or sometimes surpass the amount of red in the figure.  That is surely less important than 
accounting for the upthrust of the mountains from 1983 through 1995 and the sudden declension 
thereafter.   
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Figure 3:  Successful Section 2 Cases  
in Covered and Non-Covered Jurisdictions, 1957-2014 
 
 
Before 1982, Section 2 was barely used at all, and it was in limbo after Justice Stewart’s 
decision, for a four-person plurality, in the 1980 case of City of Mobile v. Bolden,
26
 that to be 
constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2 had to be interpreted as requiring proof 
of intentional discrimination.  But when Congress amended the statute in 1982 to provide that it 
was only necessary to prove a discriminatory effect, and when it carefully specified a series of 
factors that would satisfy the burden of proof, attorneys hastened to file Section 2 cases, judges 
felt obliged to award victories to plaintiffs who ticked off the items on the Senate’s list, and 
jurisdictions became eager to settle out of court.  The number of successful cases exploded from 
3 in 1981 to 121 by 1984.  After a majority of the Supreme Court sustained the 1982 
congressional amendments and seemingly simplified the evidence necessary for minority 
plaintiffs to win in the 1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles,
27
 the number of minority Section 2 
victories rose to 175 in 1988.  By contrast, after a conservative 5-4 majority ruled that 
redistricting which increased the number of minority opportunity districts was suspect in the 
1993 Shaw v. Reno case
28
 and followed that by ruling in Miller v. Johnson
29
 that a district drawn 
with a “predominant” (minority) racial intent was unconstitutional whatever its shape, the 
number of Section 2 cases plummeted from 80 in 1995 to just 6 in 2001.  Attorneys rightly 
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feared that Shaw and Miller reflected a general change in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward 
voting rights, one that would affect all issues, not just redistricting. 
 The amount of racial discrimination in election laws did not suddenly skyrocket in 1982, 
and it did not suddenly abate in 1995.  Just as the earlier maps made clear that discrimination 
continued to be concentrated in covered jurisdictions, Figure 3 demonstrates that the ebb and 
flow of cases proving discrimination has been largely due to responses to decisions by Congress 
and the courts. 
 Figure 4 demonstrates that a similar story can be told about Section 5 as about Section 2.  
Section 5 matured before Section 2, but only because the Supreme Court decision in Allen v. 
Board of Elections
30
 in 1969 allowed Section 5 lawsuits and objections to election laws that 
diluted minority votes, and not just to those that affected the individual right to vote per se.  The 
number of successful Section 5 cases and objections rose from 4 in 1968 to 76 in 1976.  Then in 
1976, the Supreme Court clamped down, ruling in Beer v. U.S.
31
 that not all election law changes 
that had a discriminatory effect were illegal, only those that actually made minorities worse off 
than they had previously been.  Laws that could be shown to have had a discriminatory intent, 
usually a more difficult matter to prove, were still deemed violative of Section 5.  The number of 
Section 5 events dropped by half, to 38, by 1981.  But Congress in a footnote to the authoritative 
Senate Report 97-417 on the 1982 amendments to the VRA suggested that the Department of 
Justice should effectively ignore Beer and refuse to preclear any election law that had a 
discriminatory effect, not just those that were retrogressive.
32
  That suggestion, combined with 
the increasing willingness of the Department of Justice to accept evidence that election law 
changes had been adopted with a discriminatory intent,
33
 allowed the number of Section 5 
objections and requests to local and state jurisdictions for more information to grow after 1982.  
They reached a pinnacle of 89 in 1992, the year before Shaw v. Reno. 
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Figure 4:  Section 5 Objections and Cases,  
  1957-2014 
 
 
 What if Allen had been decided the other way and Congress had not acted to overturn or 
at least undercut it?  What if the VRA had always been confined, as Justice Clarence Thomas has 
explicitly favored,
34
 only to guaranteeing minorities the right to vote, not to attack election 
structures that deny them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in areas where 
there is racially polarized voting?  Or what if Beer had been decided in 1970, before the 1971 
round of redistricting, or even earlier?  At that point, there were very few African-Americans or 
Latinos who had been elected to any offices in the South.  Any contention that a change in an 
electoral structure would make them worse off than being able to elect no representatives at all 
could easily have been dismissed as purely speculative, if not entirely illogical – because it 
would be hard to retrogress starting at zero.  Or, on the other hand, what if Shaw v. Reno had 
decided that redistricting that took race into account in order to rectify generations of racial 
discrimination in politics or to comply with Sections 2 and/or 5 of the VRA was entirely 
consonant with the constitution?
35
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 Historians and philosophers have often employed such counterfactuals to explore causal 
statements.  When used carefully, a counterfactual can be a powerful mode of argument.
36
  This 
dataset makes it possible to answer at least some of the questions about the effects of Supreme 
Court decisions empirically, thereby casting further light on the contentions of Chief Justice 
Roberts about the trends in racial discrimination in voting. 
 Figure 5 charts successful Section 5 objections and lawsuits over time.  The blue area is 
the same as in Figure 4, but the red portion deletes objections and lawsuits to enforce Section 5 if 
those objections or lawsuits concerned election structures – at-large elections, residency 
requirements, numbered seat requirements, majority-vote requirements, annexations, and 
redistricting.  Most of the remaining objections concern changes in voting laws that might have 
been contested even if the Allen decision had never been made, such as precinct line changes, 
alterations in candidate qualifications, voting registration procedures, and purges of voter lists.  
Nearly two-thirds of the Section 5 objections and lawsuits, 970 out of 1523, would not have been 
lodged if vote dilution had been excluded from Section 5.  The difference between the red and 
blue areas illustrates with considerable accuracy the effect of the Allen decision.  Moving Beer 
forward to 1971 or earlier would probably have had the same effect as eliminating Allen, because 
it would have placed the comparison date for a retrogressive effect at a point when there were 
almost no minority officeholders, making a Section 5 objection to an electoral structure nearly 
impossible. 
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Figure 5:  Charting the Effect of Allen:  Section 5 Objections If No 
Vote Dilution Mechanisms Had Been Considered Illegal,  
Compared to What Actually Happened 
 
 
 We can specify an analogous counterfactual in order to weigh the effect of the Supreme 
Court’s 1980 decision in Mobile v. Bolden.  If Congress had not amended Section 2 in 1982 to 
reverse Bolden’s intent requirement, then it is logical to assume that no Section 2 cases would 
have been filed thereafter, because intent cases could just as easily have been brought under the 
14
th
 and/or 15
th
 amendments.  Assuming that Allen and Beer had actually been decided when 
they were and just as they were, we can isolate the effect of Bolden by subtracting Section 2 
cases after 1982 from the total number of voting rights events.  Figure 6 accomplishes this in a 
fashion parallel to Figure 5. By construction, the red and blue areas are entirely congruent with 
each other until 1982.  After 1982, they diverge, the blue area representing all the actual events, 
the red, all the events except the 1174 Section 2 cases that took place after 1982.  We assume, 
contrary to fact, that Congress did not strengthen Section 2 by overturning Bolden.   (As is well 
known, the young John Roberts was one of the leaders of the Reagan Administration’s fight 
against the Bolden amendment.)
37
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Figure 6:  Voting Rights Events if Bolden Had Not Been Overturned 
 
 
 
 
 The effect of the decision, cutting off more than a quarter of all the successful voting 
rights events, is forcefully portrayed in Figure 6.  The mountains are leveled, the valleys deepen, 
and the whole graph looks much more subdued from 1982 until 1999, after which the red and 
blue areas converge.  It is not unrealistic to postulate that there would have been substantially 
fewer measurable voting rights events but for the 1982 congressional “Bolden amendment.”  Six 
hundred and eleven of the total 1174 Section 2 events that took place after 1982 were consent 
agreements or settlements.  It is difficult to imagine nearly so many lawsuits being favorably 
concluded without going to trial if the plaintiffs had had to bear the burden of proof in intent 
cases.   
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IV. California Shows That There Is Still a Need for Voting Rights Acts 
 
 If the precipitous decline in the number of voting rights events after 1995 is not enough to 
convince a reader that the relative dearth of very recent cases and objections is to a considerable 
degree the result of Supreme Court rulings that make it more difficult for minority plaintiffs to 
win voting rights cases, perhaps a glance at California will.  California is now a majority-
minority state, and the Latino population has been increasing since 1970 at a much more rapid 
rate than the proportion of Latino officeholders has.  Hundreds of city councils, school boards, 
and community college boards throughout the state are elected at-large, but Latinos have not 
succeeded in being elected to those bodies in nearly the proportions that their co-ethnics 
comprise in the population or even in the citizen voting-age population.
38
  Voting rights lawyers, 
led by former Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney Joaquin Avila, 
sought for years to attack this problem by bringing lawsuits under Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, 
but their success was uneven.
39
  When an opportunity presented itself, Avila and Robert Rubin of 
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights drafted what became the California Voting Rights 
Act (CVRA), signed into law in 2002.
40
  Compared to Section 2 of the national VRA, the CVRA 
reduced the proof needed to establish a violation to evidence that voting was racially polarized in 
the jurisdiction and, to a lesser extent, to a showing that minorities had difficulty getting elected 
there.  There was no intent requirement, and minorities did not have to satisfy the “Gingles 
factor” of proving that they could comprise a majority of the voting-age or citizen voting-age 
population of a prospective district.  In practice, another provision of the CVRA turned out to be 
crucial:  If minority plaintiffs win, they and their attorneys may be awarded fees and costs, but if 
they lose, they do not have to reimburse the jurisdiction unless their lawsuit is determined to be 
frivolous.
41
 
 After Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge Roger M. Beauchesne in 2005 declared the 
CVRA unconstitutional because it benefitted only minorities, it took more than two-and-a-half  
years for the California Court of Appeal to overturn the lower court decision and for the 
California and U.S. Supreme Courts to decline to overturn the Court of Appeal.  What happened 
next considerably amplified the effect of the ruling in Sanchez v. Modesto:
42
 Avila and Rubin, 
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who had litigated the case, were awarded $3 million in legal fees, a number that reverberated 
loudly in city halls and school board offices just as the Great Recession savaged their budgets.
43
  
Facing large costs, local jurisdictions began to settle cases and to preclude lawsuits by switching 
to districts before they could be sued, and attorneys who had never filed voting rights cases 
before began to enter the field.  Because school boards and community college boards must seek 
permission from state governing bodies before changing their electoral structures, we have both a 
fairly complete, though frequently updated, record of which local bodies planned to abandon at-
large elections and proof that they were doing so to avoid or settle lawsuits.
44
 
 Figure 7 shows the initial results of the effort to integrate Latinos into the local governing 
structures of California by forcing districts to substitute district or sometimes, proportional 
representation methods of election for the previous at-large rules.  There were few successful 
VRA lawsuits under Sections 2 or 5 in California before 2007.  After the CVRA pressure 
ratcheted up and both sides in potential lawsuits had hired expert witnesses or consultants to 
perform statistical analyses of racial polarization in relevant elections, districts began to settle in 
droves.  This was especially the case with school districts that had majority- or near-majority 
Latino student populations, but no Latino school board members.  Nearly 100 school boards have 
switched from at-large elections at the time of this writing.  Figure 7 shows a massive red spike, 
representing CVRA cases after 2008, which will probably broaden as more data becomes 
available. 
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Figure 7:  California Proves That Discrimination Persists 
 If You Have the Tools to Find It 
 
 
 California did not suddenly become more discriminatory after Sanchez v. Modesto. 
Indeed, it is unquestionably less discriminatory than when in 1994 a majority of voters favored 
Proposition 187, which sought to deny governmental services, including public schools, to 
undocumented persons. What actually happened was that the CVRA and the favorable decision 
in Sanchez gave attorneys the tools with which to expose existing discrimination and to cure it.  
If attorneys across the nation had similarly sharp tools, not instruments blunted or destroyed 
altogether by Supreme Court rulings since 1993, they might well uncover discriminatory 
electoral structures and restrictions on individual voting rights comparable to or, likely, at greater 
levels than those in California.  Of 340 American cities where more than 20% of the population 
is black, African-Americans enjoy less representation on the city councils than their proportion 
in the population in 338.
45
  Most of these cities are in the South, and at least some have at-large 
elections or elect officials in off-year elections.  Especially in the light of the publicity given to 
the underrepresentation issue by the example of Ferguson, Missouri, many of these cities would 
be targets for reform if other states had laws like California’s or if federal court rulings made the 
lower federal courts more favorable venues for VRA lawsuits. 
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V. Conclusion:  It Was Still a Congruent and Proportional 
Remedy 
 
During preparations for congressional consideration of amendments to the VRA in 2006, 
commentators frequently warned that the Supreme Court might employ its ruling in City of 
Boerne v. Flores
46
 to question whether Congress had assembled enough evidence of 
discrimination to satisfy a majority of the justices that Section 5 was still “congruent and 
proportional” to the problem.47  As a consequence, “Boerne” became the abbreviation for the 
reason for compiling such a huge record for that renewal, a much larger compilation of evidence 
than for the original passage or the renewals of 1970, 1975, or 1982.
48
  It therefore came as a 
surprise to proponents of minority voting rights that in Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts not 
only did not discuss the evidence that Congress had so carefully prepared, but also that he did not 
cite or mention Boerne in his opinion.
49
  Indeed, the chief justice did not consider the level of 
scrutiny at all and seemed to propose a “logical” basis test, rather than the traditional “rational” 
basis test that the Supreme Court had employed in Katzenbach and that Justice Ginsburg 
explicitly relied upon in her dissent in Shelby County.
50
  Evidence from vote dilution cases, the 
Chief Justice asserted, did not justify continuing to use the initial Section 4 coverage formula, 
because it was “based on voting tests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution.”51  In other 
words, a coverage formula must not merely isolate a problem; the problem that it spotlights must 
constitute the formula.  If that is really what the Chief Justice meant, then evidence largely from 
cases concerning electoral structures would be irrelevant to evaluating the strength of his 
opinion. 
But such a reading cannot be justified, because it would implicitly undercut 44 years of 
judicial and congressional decisions.  The Chief Justice did not purport to overrule so many cases 
or to discount the three rounds of congressional renewal of Section 5 before 2006.  When a 7-2 
majority of the Supreme Court ruled in 1969 in Allen v. State Board of Elections that Section 5 
pertained to changes in electoral structures, as well as to measures touching the individual right 
to vote, it rejected dissenting Justice John Marshall Harlan’s argument that its interpretation 
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logically and practically disconnected Section 5 from Section 4’s formula.52  Although Chief 
Justice Roberts did not explicitly mention Justice Harlan’s position, his argument closely 
paralleled Harlan’s.  From 1969 until 2013, both Congress and the Court had repeatedly 
explicitly accepted the majority’s position in Allen, only Justices Thomas and Scalia rejecting it 
in Hall v. Holder.   In its renewals of Section 5 in 1970, 1975, and 1982, Congress specifically 
approved Allen
53
 and relied on evidence from vote dilution cases as a justification for renewal.  
The Supreme Court also specifically reaffirmed the majority opinion in Allen and accepted that 
Section 5 covered vote dilution in its three cases previous to Northwest Austin that explicitly 
considered the validity of Section 5.
54
  In fact, every major Supreme Court case that has 
considered Section 5 contentions from Perkins v. Matthews
55
 and Beer to Georgia v. Ashcroft
56
 
and Northwest Austin has explicitly or implicitly considered that dilutive practices are subject to 
Section 5.  If he had meant to reject all of these precedents on the meaning and constitutionality 
of applying Section 5 to electoral structures, the Chief Justice would surely have made the point 
more clearly.  We may therefore conclude that the record of VRA cases and objections since 
1969 is relevant to assessing the empirical support for Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Shelby 
County. 
And that empirical support was critical, because even the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Chief Justice’s opinion rested on empirical grounds.  Despite the fact that Katzenbach had 
rejected an attack on Section 5 that was based on a case that concerned the admission of new 
states,
57
 the Chief Justice in Northwest Austin had asserted that “the fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty” of the states called into question any coverage scheme that treated states 
differently.   In Shelby County, he insisted even more strongly on “the tradition of equal 
sovereignty” of the states, which he did not connect explicitly to any constitutional provision.58  
But a departure from that principle or tradition could be justified, as Chief Justice Roberts said it 
had been at the time of the first passage of the VRA in 1965, by evidence that the problems to be 
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remedied were focused principally on a few states and localities. 
59
 Thus, even the theoretical 
justification of the Chief Justice’s opinion can be seen to have rested on two empirical 
generalizations:  First, that voting discrimination had declined so much by 2006 that Congress no 
longer had sufficient justification to address it.  Second, that whatever discrimination remained 
was no longer concentrated in the states and counties singled out by Section 4.   
This paper marshals more evidence, more systematically than any previous research, to 
assess those two propositions, and it rejects both.  An objective observer in 2006 comparing the 
number and location of all successful voting rights events in the period since the last renewal in 
1982 with the events of the years from 1957 to 1981 would conclude that Section 5 needed to be 
renewed, and that the coverage scheme still fit the problem remarkably well, hitting the target 
about 94% of the time.  Even among Section 2 cases, which could be filed anywhere in the 
country, 83.2% of the successful cases from 1982 through 2005 originated in covered 
jurisdictions.  Although these exact statistics were not available, the interest groups on whose 
research the statistics are largely based had made an overwhelming showing on the two points.
60
  
To the extent that there had been a decline in the number of cases and objections since the early 
1990s, those who followed voting rights activity would have recognized the significance of 
adverse Supreme Court opinions, which were heavily criticized by civil rights forces.  And 
experienced lawyers, such as most members of Congress, would have recognized that more cases 
would be filed if precedents were favorable and fewer, if they were unfavorable, and that trends 
in successful cases over time therefore reflected more than merely the level of discrimination.   
Whatever the degree or version of scrutiny that should have been applied in Shelby 
County, then – rational basis, congruence and proportionality, or compelling state interest and 
narrow tailoring – the evidence before Congress in 2006 or available now, especially including 
the most recent experience under the CVRA, should have supported an opinion upholding the 
coverage scheme in Section 4 and the continuation of the supervision of voting laws under 
Section 5.  When confronted with the facts of the history of voting rights since Congress began 
to regulate it in 1957, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Shelby County is found wanting.  That 
history shows that the VRA retained what Chief Justice Warren termed its “Constitutional 
propriety” in 2013.  
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Appendix A:  Sources of Voting Rights “Events” 
I. Cases Brought by the United States Department of Justice 
 
Brief of the United States in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, pp. 44-45, n. 33 (cases, 1957-65).  
Voting Rights Act, House Hearings, 1965, Tables B2(a), B3(a), B4(a). 
 
Voting Rights Act, House Hearings, 1975, Serial No. 1, Part 1, pp. 198-216 (cases, 1965-75).  
 
Voting Rights Act, Senate Hearings, 1982, Vol. I, pp. 1803-05, 1828-29, 1837-41, 1849 
(1975- 82 cases).  
 
“Attachments to the Statement of Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
Rights Division, Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on Amending the Voting Rights Act, March 1, 1982  (unpublished 12-page 
memo). 
 
“Voting Section Cases in Which the United States’ Participation Began Since October 1, 
1976" (unpublished 27-page memo in Department of Justice, dated Jan. 17, 2008. 
 
“Section 5 Declaratory Judgment Actions” (unpublished 12-page memo in Department of 
Justice, dated Oct. 18, 2005). 
 
“All Section 4 Bailout Cases Filed under the Current Bailout Standard through October 17, 
2005 (unpublished, undated 2-page memo). 
 
“Table 1: Voting Rights Cases Brought on Behalf of American Indians and/or Interpreting 
the Voting Rights Act re Indian Interests” (unpublished, undated, 8-page memo). 
 
 
II. Cases Brought by Public Interest Groups and Individuals or 
Settlements Brought About by Such Cases 
 
ACLU, “Voting Rights in the South: Ten Years of Litigation Challenging Continuing 
Discrimination Against Minorities” (1982). 
 
“Vote: The Case for Extending and Amending the Voting Rights Act: Voting Rights 
Litigation, 1982-2006: A Report of the Voting Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties 
Union.” available at. <http://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/case-extending-and-amending-voting-
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rights-act/>.  
 
ACLU “Promises to Keep: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in 2006.” “ACLU Voting 
Rights Project Litigation Docket: Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007," available at: 
https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2006.    
 
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Litigation Docket: Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007,” available at: 
https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2007. 
 
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Annual Report: January 1, 2008-December 31, 2008,” available 
at: https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2008. 
 
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Annual Report, January 1, 2009-December 31, 2009," available 
at: < https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2009>. 
 
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Annual Report: January 1, 2010-December 31, 2010,” available 
at: https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2010. 
 
“Voting Rights in Indian Country: A Special Report of the Voting Rights Project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union” (September 2009).  
 
“Joaquin G. Avila Voting Rights Cases” (unpublished 15-page memo dated March 
2009), courtesy of Joaquin Avila.  
 
James U. Blacksher, List of “Dillard v. Crenshaw County”Cases, courtesy of James U. 
Blacksher, (unpublished memo dated Aug. 3, 2009), courtesy of James U. Blacksher.  
James Blacksher, Edward Still, Jon M. Greenbaum, Nick Quinton, Cullen Brown and Royal 
Dumas, “Voting Rights in Alabama: 1982-2006,” Review of Law and Social Justice, 17 
(2008), 249-81. 
 
Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds., Quiet Revolution in the South (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1994). Cases not explicitly referred to in book are available at: 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6646?author[0]=Davidson%2C+Chandler&amp;pa
ging.startRow=1.  
 
Anita Earls, Case Lists for North Carolina, 1982-   (unpublished 38-page memo), courtesy of 
Anita Earls.   
 
“Significant Cases” of Jose Garza (unpublished, undated, 2-page memo), courtesy of Jose Garza.  
 
Stanislaus Anthony Halpin, Jr., “The Anti-Gerrymander: The Impact of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 Upon Louisiana Parish Redistricting,” (Ph.D. thesis, George 
Washington University, 1978). 
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Ellen Katz database on Section 2 cases, described in Ellen Katz, with Margaret Aisenbrey, 
Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse, and Anna Weisbrodt, “Documenting Discrimination in Voting: 
Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the 
Voting Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School,”39 Univ. of Mich. Jl. of Law 
Reform 643 (2006), courtesy of Ellen Katz.  
 
George Korbel, “Litigation in Texas Relating to A.  Statewide Redistricting  B.  Section 2 
litigation against Texas cities and school districts  C.  Section 5 Objections to Statewide 
Redistricting  D.  Section 5 Objections to Statutes relating to the Election Process in Texas #.  
Litigation filed after the 2011 redistricting on submission to this Court” (unpublished 13-page 
memo)), courtesy of George Korbel. 
 
Brian K. Landsberg, Free at last to vote:  the Alabama origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  
Lawrence, Kansas:  University Press of Kansas, 2007). 
 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, “Voting Rights in the States,” (2006), 
available at 
<http://www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vra/states.html>.  
 
Justin Levitt, Database on Preclearance and More Information Requests, 2011, courtesy of 
Justin Levitt. 
 
Justin Levitt, “Questions for the Record from Senator Charles E. Grassley ‘From Selma to 
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Appendix B:  How the Dataset Was Compiled 
 Since of the case lists, only Prof. Ellen Katz’s was in the form of a database file, my first 
undergraduate research assistant, Adam Adler, and I created a new Excel form which eventually 
grew to contain a much larger number and range of categories than Prof. Katz had coded.  It 
began with Katz’s dataset and was expanded to include the lists from the Department of Justice 
and from the American Civil Liberties Union and Leadership Conference of Civil Rights lists 
and reports.  Gradually, cases drawn from the other lists in Appendix A were added, as well as 
the Section 5 objections from the Department of Justice website and the list of “More 
Information Requests” from a dataset kindly provided by Prof. Luis Fraga and Maria L. Ocampo. 
 Each case or other event was traced to a specific county, and all counties in the U.S. were 
entered into the dataset, whether they contained events or not, and given a standard GIS indicator 
so that they could be coordinated with maps.  Information on the ethnic composition of the 
population, voting age population, and, when available, citizen voting-age population, both for 
2000, 2010 and for the date at which a case was concluded or an objection or MIR was made, 
were matched with each event. 
 Since there were so many diverse lists, many overlapping, a considerable effort was made 
to avoid duplication by identifying each event with a specific name, civil action number, and/or 
case citation.  This was often very difficult, since some lists gave only case names, others only 
case numbers, and others, only published case citations, and since many case names were the 
same (for example, U.S. v. Texas).  Sometimes, it was a matter of judgment whether two cases 
with the same name should be represented as one case or two.  Where citations to published 
cases were available, an effort was made to read them so that any more information that was 
available in them could be extracted.  For example, attorneys in some of the cases on Prof. 
Katz’s list had raised constitutional issues, in addition to Section 2 issues, but she had not coded 
the constitutional issues, because she was focused only on Section 2. 
 An effort was made to categorize the issues involved in each case and objection (if there 
was more than one issue, the event was NOT counted more than once), as well as the legal bases 
for each case.  Cases below the state level were categorized by the form of the local jurisdiction 
(city government, county government, education agency).  Attempts were made to identify the 
attorneys involved in each case by the organization that they represented (U.S. government, 
ACLU, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, etc.).  Where possible, the 
ethnicity of the challenging or defending minority plaintiff was noted.  Sometimes, this was 
referred to in the text of cases; sometimes, it was apparent from the case location (if Mr. Jones 
sued a school board in Mississippi, there was a very low likelihood that he was Latino, Asian-
American, or Native American), or from the plaintiff’s last name.  Where there were multiple 
plaintiffs with names of apparently different ethnicity, all of the relevant ethnicities were coded. 
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 Especially for the period before 1982 and after 2006, the footnotes and textual citations to  
cases were searched for and linked to in order to expand the number of cases at times when the 
available lists were inadequate.  Footnotes and tables in monographs and articles on the VRA 
were scoured for more case names and descriptions.  For CVRA cases, lists from the state board 
of education and state community college board were supplemented by evidence from newspaper 
articles and such irregular sources as the websites of consultants who specialize in advising 
school districts on CVRA matters. 
 Finally, a rather fruitless effort was made to discover other cases that resulted in consent 
decrees or other settlements by examining subject categories in PACER and reading the case 
files of cases linked to “voting” and similar topics. 
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